Turkish goal of Takism

[Prokomenos]

I found this off
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its pretty good and very interesting. Read on for those interested.

Turkish Goal of Takism

In Cyprus, during the late 1950s a Turkish Cypriot paramilitary organisation known as Turk Mukavemet Teskilati (TMT) was formed. It was armed and supported by Turkey and it had an extreme pro-partition agenda.

The great difficulty with TMT’s programme was that it required the uprooting of a quarter of a million people - both Greek and Turkish Cypriots - and their removal from their historic and ancestral lands. It is not surprising therefore that it was opposed by the vast majority of the island’s population. It would only have been possible to do this forcibly. The Turkish invasion can therefore be traced back to the formation of TMT and the need to forcibly separate the populations.

TMT emerged with Ankara’s support as a powerful force, and exercised a crucial influence over the affairs of the Turkish-Cypriot community. One of its founders was Rauf Denktash, the current Turkish Cypriot political spokesman in occupied Cyprus.
The decision to create TMT was taken at the highest levels of the Turkish Menderes Government in Ankara. While facing mounting pressure from public opinion, the Turkish Government decided to use the Cyprus question as a diversion to keep the Turkish military quiet, an ever present factor in Turkish politics: that is how TMT was conceived. TMT fighters were trained, armed and led by a small group of well-disciplined Turkish officers. It established cells in towns and villages throughout Cyprus, and it selected personnel who were to be sent to Turkey for military training. It was also to become the organisational tool through which the geo-political partitionist policy of Turkey was to be enforced in Cyprus. It was a policy which aimed at segregating the Turkish and Greek Cypriots from each other as a prelude to the physical division of the island.
During the course of 1957, TMT pressured the Turkish Cypriots into withdrawing from any co-operative ties they had with the Greek Cypriots and, on the whole, they were successful; this policy later became known as the `from Turk to Turk policy’. Such encouragement was entirely alien to the co-operation and quiet existence which had always prevailed between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but was necessary to sow the seeds of partition. A similar policy was followed in Istanbul, organised by the Turkish National Student Federation, which had worked closely with Kibris Turktur in its planning of the anti-Greek riots there back in 1955.

In Cyprus this crude policy of enforced segregation did not go unopposed amongst the Turkish Cypriots. TMT’s answer to criticism was however rapid and brutal. It assassinated prominent Turkish Cypriots who dared to publicly voice opposition or advocated co-operation between Greeks and Turks. The most widely known such murders were those of Fazil Ondur, the chief editor of the weekly newspaper Inkilapci, who was killed on 29 May 1959; and Ahmet Yahaya, a committee member of the Turkish Cypriot Athletic and Culture centre, who was killed on 5 June 1958. An attempt was also made on the life of Arif Barudi on 3 July 1958, and another one on Ahmet Sadi, the director of the Turkish office of the Pancypriot Labour Federation who, soon after the attempt against his life, left Cyprus to settle in England. The same policy continues today with the assassination in July 1996 of Kutlu Adali, the Turkish Cypriot journalist, who had the courage to condemn the partitionist project of the Turkish military establishment which leads the foreign policy of Ankara, and who advocated closer co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
TMT’s strategy was one of incitement in the hope of provoking inter-ethnic conflict with the aim of securing the separation of the two communities. It did so without any consideration to likely casualties amongst innocent Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The first such serious inter-communal fighting began in June 1958 and was the result of such incitement which the Turkish authorities have subsequently been candid on a number of occasions. Mr Emin Dirvana, a former Turkish diplomat, said: `I was informed that on 7 June 1958 a bomb had been planted in the Turkish press office in Nicosia by persons who, as was later established, had nothing to do with the Greek Cypriots. The Turks of Nicosia were then incited to be overwhelmed by holy indignation and perpetrated acts similar to those committed on 6 and 7 September 1955 in Istanbul.’

In the ITN documentary `Cyprus, Britain’s Grim Legacy’ the account continues:
`The explosion sparked off a night of riot in Nicosia. Turkish Cypriots burned and looted Greek shops and homes. Soon came counter attacks and the fighting spread around the island. A friend of mine, whose name must still be kept secret, was to confess to me that he had put this little bomb in the doorway in order to create an atmosphere of tension so that people would know that the Turkish Cypriots mattered.’
In fact, nobody had ever claimed that the Turkish Cypriots did not matter. This reveals the essence of the matter, that the Turkish Cypriot leadership, first in Ottoman times and then during the British administration, had always occupied a position of political privilege as an ally of the occupying power. These privileges were not something the leadership were willing to give up. During early British rule, the alliance with the Turkish minority became clear in the legislative council. It worked on the principle that the British and Turkish members at least equalled or outnumbered by one vote the Greeks.

The tactics of TMT, to provoke ethnic conflict when none would otherwise have arisen, were soon to be successful. On 12 June 1958, following the press office bomb explosion, British security forces rounded up eight Greek Cypriots from the village of Kondemenos and subsequently released them near the Turkish Cypriot village of Guenyeli, approximately seven miles from where they were arrested, and a good distance from the nearest Greek villages; the released Greek Cypriots were subsequently massacred by Turkish Cypriots acting on the orders of TMT. These were the first reported inter-communal killings. These killings were carried out in the certain knowledge that Greek Cypriots would also carry out revenge attacks.

Turkey rushed to put forward a formal protest to Britain the day following the press office bomb, alleging that the Cyprus administration had failed to give the Turkish minority adequate protection. `Cyprus, partition or death, was the slogan constantly repeated by Turkish leaders and the armed paramilitaries. The claim was that Turkish Cypriots could not think of themselves as being integrated into Cypriot society. The fact that they already were, necessitated a strategy of tension and forced separation.

The principle of partition was not based on the realities of Cypriot society at the time, but on Turkey’s perceived security requirements alone. In the Summer of 1958, in the mixed suburb of Omorphita in Nicosia, TMT evicted 700 Greeks from their homes. By the end of July 1958 a much clearer line had been drawn between the Greek and Turkish quarters. The reluctance of British authorities to deal even-handedly with the violence became clearer when the partisan decisions made by the Courts at the time is taken into account. Whereas Turks arrested for participating in the riots were released, Greeks received custodial sentences for minor offences.

Sixteen Turks were, for example, arrested by the British authorities for complicity in the Nicosia riots, but they were released on condition that they stayed in at night. A Turkish policeman, sergeant Tuna, was charged with possessing a bomb and ammunition for which the mandatory penalty was clearly the death penalty. He was released and left immediately for Turkey. The only official piece of evidence that Turkish policeman were involved in bomb attacks had conveniently `disappeared’. By contrast, two Greeks who pulled down a Union Jack were each given 18 months prison sentences, whilst those subsequently involved with the possession of fire arms were hanged. In hindsight, it is hardly surprising that Greek Cypriots saw a conspiracy against their struggle for self-determination from British and Turkish Cypriot sources.

The riots in Nicosia caused by the bomb in the Turkish press office, resulted in the deaths of 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots. The higher number of Greek casualties demonstrates that the Turkish Cypriots (who of course were outnumbered in Cyprus 5:1 by Greek Cypriots) had, on the orders of TMT, pre-arranged strongholds and were thus able to fight from a much stronger position than their numerical inferiority would suggest. Clearly, by the end of 1958 the Greek Cypriot demand for self-determination was still unacceptable to both Britain and Turkey, although a new compromise needed to be worked out.

The London-Zurich agreements of 1959 finally set up the Republic of Cyprus with Archbishop Makarios III being duly elected its first President, and Dr Fazil Kutcuk its Turkish Cypriot Vice President, by their respective communities in December 1959. The Republic of Cyprus officially came into being on 16 August 1960.
Under the terms of the 1960 constitution, there was to be a fixed ratio of 70 Greek Cypriot employees for every 30 Turkish Cypriots employed by government agencies. The Turkish Cypriot leadership demanded that this parity of employment be attained within five months of independence. The public service commission pointed to the numerous difficulties of drawing 30% of the civil service including the police force from just 18% of the population. As a result, numerous posts remained unfulfilled in the search for suitably qualified Turkish Cypriot candidates.

Since a majority vote of the Turkish Cypriot deputies in the house was needed to pass tax legislation, the Turkish Cypriots used it as a bargaining tool to force compliance over the 70:30 ratio and various other issues which had as their objective the continued segregation of the two ethnic groups. For example, colonial laws had to be extended eight times while both communities discussed legislation relating to separate municipalities. This provision had been the greatest victory for Turkey in this settlement. The President offered the Turks compensating safeguards, but was not prepared to implement provisions which opened the way to partition. Deadlock inevitably resulted again and again in a number of other areas.

Already by the end of the 1961 the Turkish language press was calling for intervention by the powers, meaning the UK and the US. In essence, there was a fundamental belief on the part of the Turkish Cypriots in the eventual intervention of Turkey to establish the partition of Cyprus. This belief underpinned their unco-operative attitude towards the Greek Cypriots and, not surprisingly, created the cycle of mistrust amongst Turkish Cypriots which culminated in the crisis of 1963. Indeed, one of the starkest indications of the Turkish Cypriot mistrust were the brutal political murders of Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Gurkhan in 1962 by TMT. Both Hikmet and Gurkhan were publishers who advocated closer association and co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. TMT was again in action to ensure that the genuine voice of the Turkish Cypriots was silenced, and this applied not only to journalists and publishers, but to many political activists and ordinary people too.

[Prokomenos]

From independence to 1963, it proved impossible to construct any basis of trust, and many areas of government were unable to function. The Cypriots found themselves in the position of not even being able to execute simple tax laws due to the way in which legislation was being used by the Turkish Cypriot leadership and their political mentors in Turkey. The Greek Cypriots claimed with some justification that the Turkish Cypriots were using partitionist and non co-operative tactics, which was made possible by the constitution itself.

It was against this background that the Akritas plan emerged as a political strategy to remove the restrictions imposed by the 1960 constitution, and to abrogate both the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, which allowed for armed intervention in Cyprus by Britain, Greece and Turkey, not unilateral intervention (but not by military action by any one state). President Makarios sought a way of breaking the deadlock in the administration and submitted for discussion, in accordance with the Akritas plan, 13 possible constitutional amendments. Copies of the proposed amendments were sent to Ankara for information purposes only since Turkey was a guarantor power. Yet even before the Turkish Cypriot leadership could reply, Ankara rejected the proposals as impossible, even as a basis for discussion, though the opinion of Turkish Cypriots had not been sought and this effectively ended the Akritas plan. Makarios had not referred to Athens before making his proposals, but was acting quite properly as the head of state of what was, after all, an independent state. Turkish Cypriot propagandists, however, cite the Akritas plan as proof of a Greek Cypriot plot to commit genocide against them, by somehow equating enosis, the subject of the plan, with genocide. This is clearly a nonsense; it was simply a constitutional framework devised to break a constituted social cohesion.

The inter-communal violence that followed was triggered on 21 December 1963 by an incident in Nicosia involving the shooting of a policeman. A police patrol car with Greek Cypriot officers driving down Hermes Street in the old city of Nicosia stopped a car for a routine check. Shots were fired and a young Turk was killed. The dispute that had been going on for the past three years relating to the way in which the constitution was operating, and the resultant tensions (all entirely of a political nature), now exploded into a spate of shootings which spread right across the island. On 22 December 1963 all Turkish Cypriot Government officials and politicians left their posts in a mass political protest. Overnight, all these individuals quit their jobs before any investigation had taken place. This organised reaction suggests that their actions were part of a pre-planned strategy in accordance with the tactics followed during the last few years.

Between 21 and 26 December 1963 the conflict was again centred in the Omorphita suburb of Nicosia, which had been an area of tension back in 1958. The participants now were Greek Cypriot irregulars and Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries, and numbers of civilians who were caught in the crossfire and chaos that ensued over the Christmas week. Both President Makarios and Dr Kutcuk issued calls of peace, but they were ignored. The two leaders met for the last time on 24 December 1963. Meanwhile, within a week of the violence flaring up, the Turkish army contingent had moved out of its barracks and seized the most strategic position on the island across the Nicosia to Kyrenia road, the historic jugular vein of the island. So crucial was this road to Turkish strategic thinking that they retained control of that road until 1974, at which time it acted as a crucial link in Turkey’s military invasion. From 1963 up to the point of the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974, Greek Cypriots who wanted to use the road could only do so if accompanied by a UN convoy. It was, however, a baffling strategy for protecting the Turkish Cypriot minority. Again, this demonstrated the true motivation of Turkey.

The fighting over Christmas week 1963 saw numerous civilian casualties. Hostage taking emerged on both sides, as did acts of arson and murder. Although many hostages were returned, many remained missing, presumed dead. The worst incidents yet again occurred in Omorphita. False rumours were spread that some Turkish Cypriot patients were taken from Nicosia general hospital and killed by paramilitaries. In Ayios Vasilios, on 12 January 1964, a mass grave was discovered which contained the bodies of 21 Turkish Cypriots who were presumed to have been killed in or near Ayios Vasilios on 24 December 1963. One of the most tragic acts of the period was the killing of the wife and children of a Major attached to the Turkish army contingent. Their bodies were later discovered in the bath of their home. The tactics of TMT were now fully reaping their rewards. The casualty figures over that Christmas week in 1963 vary. British military sources on the ground estimate about 100 dead on each side.

Considerable fear was felt throughout the island and about 20,000 Turkish Cypriots left their homes. Much of this movement was spontaneous and hasty following some local incident of violence. However, once they had moved, many Turkish Cypriots were placed under heavy pressure by TMT not to return to their homes. Clearly, the necessary territorial basis for partition was being established.

Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots were displaced during the period of inter-communal strife in 1963 and 1964. A Liaison Committee was established, comprising of representatives of the three guarantor powers and the two communities. This established that in February 1964 5,500 Turkish Cypriots and 1,600 Greek Cypriots had been displaced because of the fighting. The UN Secretary General estimated that eventually 25,000 Turkish Cypriots moved from their homes to nearby villages/towns. It therefore appears that 5,500 Turkish Cypriots were displaced, and that a further 19,500 were moved on the directions of the Turkish military and Turkish Cypriot leadership.

A number of points are worth noting. The Liaison Committee consisted of representatives of Britain, Greece and Turkey and the Greek and Turkish communities. The first session took place on 29 December 1963, and was chaired by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and subsequent meetings were chaired by the British High Commissioner Sir Arthur Clark. A sub-committee was given the task to examine the number of displaced persons, in its report of 1 February 1964, found that there were 5,500 Turkish Cypriots and 1,600 Greek Cypriots displaced. Yet, the UN Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council (15/6/64 Doc. S/5764) found that: `a large number of Turkish Cypriot villages from some villages with a mixed population, and from some very small Turkish Cypriot villages, moved out into more predominantly Turkish villages and towns.’ It appears that most of the Turkish Cypriots displaced were moved from their villages by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in order to back their policy of partitioning the island.

The partitioning of the island was not possible without segregation and movement of population, because Greek, Turkish and mixed villages were scattered around the island, with few concentrations of homogeneous population.

Fighting in Nicosia ended when British forces intervened at the request of President Makarios. The Green line was established between the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia and became a permanent feature of the city. The demarcation of the capital was followed by the eviction of the entire Armenian community which happened to fall in the Turkish sector. The Turks believed that the Armenians were politically aligned with the Greeks and used this as justification for their forced expulsion. However, it was also a necessity in the long term goal of creating an ethnically pure Turkish zone.
Between January and August 1964 much of the violence that took place was of a sporadic nature. The size of Cyprus, with its customs and strong traditions, the news of an incident in one village would spread fear and apprehension to neighbouring villages. The most innocuous incident was capable of sparking off confrontation in this highly charged atmosphere. Two examples serve to illustrate this point. The first occurred in Ayios Sozomenos, an ethnically mixed village in the district of Nicosia. On 6 February 1964 the Greeks were attacked and two were killed. Retaliation followed by the Greeks, and seven Turks were killed in further clashes, as well as a further nine Greeks.
The second incident was triggered in Paphos where a Turk was killed by a sniper. The Turks retaliated and a heated exchange followed. Six Greeks and a Turk were killed. Further violence flared on the nights of 8/9 March when 14 Turks and 11 Greeks were killed. These incidents demonstrate that in an atmosphere as highly charged as that of Cyprus in 1964, shootings were triggered by the slightest prompting and could quickly escalate.

Most incidents were local and retaliatory in nature, usually a specific response to a particular incident. This is, for example, illustrated by the hostage exchange that took place in March 1964. Following numerous kidnappings and hostage taking, an exchange was organised on 7 March. About 225 Turkish hostages had been seized by Greek paramilitaries, of which around 175 had never returned, while about 41 Greeks remained missing. The exchange was designed to reduce tension, but in fact it had the opposite effect. Within 24 hours of the exchange a number of shooting incidents occurred throughout Cyprus. Again, revenge appears to have been the main motivating factor.
In Ktima, Turkish Cypriots took as hostages hundreds of Greek Cypriots who were shopping in the local market. The Turkish Cypriots claimed that their action was prompted by the reports of the Turkish Cypriot hostages who had gone missing. In total, 14 Turks and 11 Greeks lost their lives in Ktima. Inter-communal contact within Ktima virtually ceased. However, such confrontations, far from being a Greek Cypriot strategy to annihilate the Turks, were symptomatic of the fear which had spread all over the island. There is no evidence to suggest that there was anything pre-meditated about any of this conflict.

In mid-February 1964, inter-communal fighting intensified in Limassol which looked like provoking a Turkish invasion. This prompted Britain to appeal to the Security Council of the UN. Subsequently, on 4 March 1964, the Security Council passed a resolution to establish a peace keeping force in Cyprus.
By 27 March 1964 the first UN units arrived to take up official duties. Their arrival did not prevent the procurement of arms to Cyprus for both sides. Evidently, Turkish Cypriot nationalists were trying to increase the temperature. The Greek Cypriots formed a National Guard, and on 4 April 1964 launched an attack on the north Western coastal villages of Kokkina and Mansoura, where the Turks had established a bridgehead for the importation of arms and the landing of heavily armed troups from Turkey.

There was a violence pattern which was repeated throughout the island: arming Turkish nationalists and securing strategic positions for them; in the meantime, armed Greeks were boudn to respond with force. Although Turkish Cypriots were sparse in the Kokkina area, they had nevertheless allegedly been led there in order to provide safety. The clear intention, however, was to establish an enclave to justify the opening of a salient within easy reach of Turkey. In the meantime, the most significant consequence of the conflict on the island was the return of General Grivas to head the newly formed National Guard, and to bring discipline to the Greek paramilitary irregulars. From this point on, Grivas and Makarios were increasingly at odds over policy matters. Grivas had always put loyalty to Greece above that of a commitment to Cyprus as an independent republic.

In August 1964, another major battle took place in the Kokkina Mansoura area. Fighting broke out on 3 August and continued until 6 August, during which the Turkish air force bombed Greek villages indiscriminately with napalm. The clash at Kokkina drew sharp attention to the realities of Cypriot vulnerability to the power politics of Turkey. A cease-fire was reached on 9 August and drew to a close this latest serious outbreak of violence.
The resulting casualties, however, give an interesting insight into these events. According to Turkish sources, the fights at Kokkina resulted in 53 Greek Cypriots dead and 125 injured. On the Turkish side, only 12 fatalities and 32 wounded are recorded. These figures reflect the degree of military preparedness on the Turkish side and again emphasise that the Turkish Cypriot strategy was one of occupying strategic positions to facilitate territorial gain through armed rebellion, although camouflaged in the language of minority protection.

By the time that the cease-fire was achieved, every Turkish enclave in Cyprus had become an entrenched position, protected by UNFICYP forces. Enclaves now existed in every major town except Kyrenia. In the Lefka area there were 8,000 well-armed Turkish Cypriots and 1,000 TMT fighters strategically positioned to join up with any landing near Xeros. The big enclave north of Nicosia almost reached the sea at Temblos in the Kyrenia district. At Ktima, the Turkish position overlooked the coast from a strong defensive position. The Larnaca enclave commanded a piece of coast ideal for the use of light landing craft. At Kophinou in the Larnaca region, Turkish positions controlled the main roads from Nicosia to Limassol and Larnaca. The Castle at St Hilarion to the Pentadactylos mountain which dominates the main road from Nicosia to the northern port of Kyrenia, was another strategic position where skirmishes occurred and which became a crucial Turkish stronghold. Military analysis suggests that on instructions from Turkey, Turkish Cypriots began deliberately to occupy these strategic areas in preparation for further conflict.

The creation of enclaves was also a flagrant violation of land property rights at the expense of Greek Cypriots.

Land Ownership by Ethnic Group:
Greek/Armenian/Maronite Cypriots 4,123,813 -> 60.9%
Turkish Cypriots 848,858 -> 12.3%
Others 32,120 -> 0.5%
State Land -> 26.3%

Source:Department of Lands and Surveys (refer to Annex 14 in Volume II of the"Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus" submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, 27 February 1987.

The table demonstrates in fact that the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots into enclaves was inconsistent with their ownership of land on the island. During this period of prolonged crisis in Cyprus, the Turkish Government forcibly expelled Greeks from Constantinople. The Greek Government, on the contrary, took no retaliatory measures against the Moslem minority in Greek Western Thrace. However, this did not stop the Turkish air force from harassing the Dodecanese (Rhodes) and Greek islands lying closest to the Turkish Aegean coast.
In Cyprus, the total reported number of casualties over the period 21 December 1963 to 9 August 1964 vary only slightly. Turkish sources estimate about 350 Turkish deaths and about 200 Greek fatalities. The numbers include deaths resulting from rogue paramilitary action, as well as from exclusively military confrontations.
Below is a set of rules issued by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to the Turkish Cypriots on 18 December 1964:

Turkish Cypriots not in possession of a permit are prohibited to enter the Greek sector.
1. Those who disobey the order with a view to trading with Greek Cypriots should pay a fine of £25 or be punished with imprisonment.
2. A fine will be imposed on:-
(a) Those who converse or enter into negotiations with Greek Cypriots or accompany any stranger into our sector.
(b) Those who come into contact with Greek Cypriots for any official work.
(c) Those who appear before Greek Cypriot courts.
(d) Those who visit the Greek Cypriot hospitals for examination or in order to obtain pharmaceuticals ....
3. A fine of £25 or other severe punishment and one months imprisonment or whipping should be imposed on those who enter the Greek Cypriot sector:-
(a) For Promenade.
(b) For friendly association with Greek Cypriots.
(c) For amusement....

This remarkable quarantining of the Turkish Cypriots from the Greek Cypriots was effected entirely by the Turkish nationalist leadership, since such a separation was needed in order to pave the way for the eventual partition of the island.
The murder of Dervis Kavazoglu in 1965 further illustrates the point. Kavazoglu was a Turkish Cypriot journalist and trade unionist who had criticised the enforced separation of the Turkish Cypriots and also the leadership’s policies. He and his Greek Cypriot friend, Costas Michaoulis, were on their way to Larnaca when they were both killed near the Turkish village of Lourougina. The are allegations that these murders were carried out on the instructions of the Turkish leadership. This again demonstrates that Turkish strategy was to divide the Greeks from the Turks.

Yet, by 1972 about 7,000 Turkish Cypriots, or 15% of the 46,000 strong Turkish Cypriot work force, worked outside the enclaves. The employment of Turkish Cypriots was closely controlled by the Turkish leadership and Turkish Cypriots needed a work permit. The stagnant Turkish Cypriot economy and rising unemployment in the enclaves were the main reasons for the decision to allow this policy. This demonstrates that the "from Turk to Turk" policy was never viable, but was simply a political nationalist ploy. It seems that Cypriots could work together amicably when it suited economic interests; but it was not possible when adopted for nationalist arguments by Turkey to advance the cause of partition.

The political significance of the enclaves far exceeded their size. The Turkish officers who were the real power behind the Turkish Cypriot throne, developed a highly militarised and rigid regime. The Turkish Cypriot leadership’s policies helped fuel the fear and su****ion which was necessary to maintain their position of authority. The UN Secretary General, U. Thant, was critical of the self-isolation policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. In effect, the Turkish Cypriots became hostages to the imposed policy of cessation dictated by TMT. It is now impossible to know what the true position of the majority of Turkish Cypriots was since their views were not sought and never publicly debated by their leaders. This treatment of the Turkish Cypriots by Turks as a political irrelevance continues to date. The lack of a genuine Turkish Cypriot voice, with the ability to put forward its own voice, rather than that of Turkey, is probably the greatest cause of the inability to resolve the Cyprus problem over the last three years.

[Prokomenos]

The most significant event of 1967 in the SE-mediterranean was the downfall of democracy in Greece and its replacement by a military junta. It has frequently been alleged that George Papadopoulos, who led the coup, had been on the
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pay-roll since 1952 and had acted as chief liaison officer between the KYP (the Greek subsidiary of the American
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) and the USA. The US administration provided training and material to the anti-constitutional forces before the coup and became their protector for seven years after.

For Cyprus, however, the consequences were to prove catastrophic. The emergence of the junta marked the beginning of a severe deterioration in relations between Athens and Nicosia, a sad affair that culminated in the military coup against Makarios in July 1974.
Since the Second World War, the US had funded an enormous military complex in Greece, and almost the entire Greek officer corp received US training. Greece was at the hub of CIA activity for the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Greek military even named their headquarters in Athens (the Pentagon) as a gesture of admiration.
Athens was the switching centre for all communications east and south of Greece, which had been received from the Middle East and Africa and then relayed to Washington. As a consequence, it was Washington who wished the Cyprus issue resolved, especially following the six day Arab-Israeli war, which acted as a timely reminder of how essential US facilities in Greece and Turkey were for the defence of Israel, as well as of NATO. The colonels agreed to meet officials of the Turkish Government, but no solution was found. In Turkey anti-Greek propaganda was yet again deliberately and cynically fuelled using protests over the alleged maltreatment of the Muslim minority in (Greek) Western Thrace. It is significant that the status of the Turkish Cypriots had improved to such an extent that Turkey was unable to continue to use this pretext. The enosis issue, however, became the chosen tool of the junta in its efforts to destabilise the Cypriot Government.

Against this background, a second major clash occurred in Cyprus on 15 November 1967. The Turkish Cypriot village of Kophinou is situated in the Larnaca area and sits on the junction where the road from Larnaca joins the road from Limassol. If cut, road communications would be disrupted and freedom of movement would be denied between the South-west and the remainder of the island. The appointment of a new Turkish officer in January 1967 to head the Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries heightened tension in the area. Known by his nom de guerre, Mehmet, a campaign of stopping traffic, altering road signs and a generally belligerent attitude aimed quite often at the local UN contingent was adopted by his paramilitaries. It was calculated to annoy, intimidate, and precipitate all but the Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish paramilitaries occupied positions on the high ground above Ayios Theodoros, the neighbouring village to Kophinou. By the Summer of 1967, the Greeks of Ayios Theodoros began to experience difficulties getting to their part of the village which could only be reached by travelling through the occupied Turkish sector. Whilst this was going on, the Greek Cypriot police decided to suspend their patrols in order to avoid any increase in tension. In September, Mehmet assaulted a UN major and was relieved of his command. The police then sought to resume their patrols, but were prevented from doing so by the Turkish paramilitaries. The tension imported by Mehmet, however, did not leave with him.
There followed two months of protracted negotiations in an attempt to restart the patrols which had taken place since the early 1960s and had only temporarily been stopped. UNFICYP agreed on the resumption of the patrols, and by mid October the UN Secretary General himself was becoming impatient at Turkish prevarication, which was clearly emanating from the Turkish leadership, and complained bitterly at Turkish Cypriot behaviour. The possibility of another no go area was unacceptable to the Cypriot Government, especially in view of the strategic significance of the junction of the Larnaca-Limassol road.

On 27 October 1967, the UN Secretary General was therefore driven to make a personal appeal to the Turkish Government, asking them to co-operate with the UN authorities in Cyprus in order to restore freedom of movement in the Kophinou area. However, his pleas were met with an obstinateness and stubbornness that has characterised Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus ever since. There followed more prevarication and on 13 November 1967 the UN met with the Cyprus government, followed on 14 November by two police patrols moving through the area. They completed their patrol unhindered. The following day, however, another police patrol following the same route was shot at by Turkish-Cypriot nationalists.

The National Guard, by this time joined by Grivas, retaliated, as the Turks knew they would, and the result was a battle which went on through the night. On 16 March, inevitably, the National Guard and the police were withdrawn. However, by then the death toll amounted to 22 Turkish casualties and one Greek. This event was isolated and did not escalate into island wide violence, as had been the case in 1963/64. This episode has since been described by Turkish propagandists as a "genocide" committed against the Turkish Cypriots. The sad reality is that it had been deliberately instigated by Turkey, who was by now playing with the lives of the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish response was immediate and pre-meditated. Turkish war planes made sorties over Greek Thrace and troops were concentrated on the Greco-Turkish border. Yet again, the threat of war and a danger to the cohesion of NATO’s southern flank emerged.

There followed an intense period of American shuttle diplomacy by President Lyndon Johnson’s envoy Cyrus Vance. The outcome was the presentation of a set of stiff demands on the Greek Junta by the Turkish Government. The result was the Junta’s agreement to virtually every Turkish demand. The colonels agreed to withdraw Grivas and all their excess troops who had entered Cyprus. Significantly, no Turkish troops from the inestimable number who had also joined the Turkish contingent since 1959 left the island. Any economic restrictions were also withdrawn from the Turkish enclaves, a gesture not reciprocated by the Turkish side, who continued to maintain their road blocades.
The political repercussions were devastating for the Greek Cypriots. The island was now virtually undefended and any threat of invasion could only be met by token resistance. The Turks could see that the Greeks were unable to use their numerical strength to establish government control over the whole island, and that Greece was unwilling to risk a war, whatever the outcome. This assured, the Turkish Cypriots proceeded to declare their "separate Turkish administration" on 29 December 1967 over those areas under their control. A few Turkish Cypriot lives had given Turkey the perfect pretext to begin its incremental annexation of Northern Cyprus.

Although the crisis had now passed, the relationship between Athens and Nicosia had irrevocably changed. From this point on the Greek military junta became convinced that the `Cyprus problem’ could only be solved by eliminating Makarios, because the price of a settlement with the Turks would inevitably be beyond anything Makarios would accept. The junta, anxious to appeal to its US masters, wanted a solution acceptable to Turkey, and this would involve some form of partition. On 12 January 1968, Makarios declared enosis officially no longer feasible. The tilt towards the acceptance of independence as the new reality was now given unambiguous official approval. Makarios followed this declaration by an election victory, in which he received 96% of the vote, an increase of 32% over the 1960 election due to communist support.

The political problem now emerging was how to present an agenda which could deal effectively with democratic imperative (Cyprus had had a legitimate communist party and a new socialist party) while making clear Cyprus’s disinterest to the Greek dictatorship.
Cyprus knew, however, that it was only a matter of time before Turkey chose to invade and complete its objectives. The primary function of the officer corp was to erode the authority of the Cyprus Government, rather than to plan for the defence of the island against the expected Turkish invasion. Indeed, given the seven year notice Cyprus had of Turkey’s intention to invade, it is remarkable that no coherent defence strategy was adopted. The Greek colonels saw this as the achievement of a common front with its NATO ally Turkey against communism. Any resistance on the part of the Cypriots to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of their state was branded anti-enosist and anti-Hellenist.

[Prokomenos]

On 15 July 1974 extreme elements nationalist of the National Guard led by its Greek officers launched a military coup with the objective of overthrowing the Government. The Presidential Palace was bombed but, for the third time Makarios escaped and was flown out of Cyprus by British forces. Nicos Sampson was installed as President. Sampson was well known for his paramilitary involvement, and as the owner of a news paper, with fanatical pro-Greek nationalistic leanings. The coup was, in essence, a short term civil war between Greek factions and was completely unrelated to the inter-communal issue which had been dormant for seven years. Indeed, the perpetrators of the coup went out of their way to tell the world that this was an internal Greek matter. The situation was now quite different to that of 1963/64. The coup involved only the Greek Cypriots and, as Denktash had acknowledged, the Turkish Cypriots were mere spectators.
Between 1967 and 1974 relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots had much improved, with no further incidents of violence by either government or paramilitary groups.

The Turks moved freely around the island. The enclaves existed only to sustain the argument for separation, although about 6,000 Turkish Cypriots had drifted back to their homes outside of the enclaves by the early 1970s. Only four months before the coup, Denktash was invited to speak at a Greek Cypriot gathering of businessmen and professionals. There was a readiness on the part of various groups of both communities to take part in seminars organised to promote inter-ethnic understanding. The improvement in relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots is acknowledged, even by the most partisan of Turcophile commentators. It is therefore extremely difficult to identify a legitimate fear on the part of the Turkish Cypriot as a result of the coup. The only human victims of the coup were the Greek Cypriots.

Having received reports of an impending coup, the US State Department and Kissinger in particular chose not to prevent it, fuelling the allegations that it had tacitly supported it. Thomas Boyatt, the Cyprus Desk officer in the State Department warned consistently of a coup and the inevitable Turkish response. Boyatt had served as a diplomat on the island. He confirmed that the Junta was planning an attack on Cyprus. His pre-coup memoranda were classified as secret and have never been released. Indeed, after the invasion Boyatt was forbidden by Kissinger to testify before Congress, and finally did so only in order to avoid being cited for contempt. Evidence was only taken in executive session of

Congress, so sensitive was it considered to be. In July 1974, even the Greek Cypriot daily Apogevmatini described in its editorial the impending coup to be carried out by EOKA-B. The US responded with a wait and see policy. After all, the outcome could well suit them, and it did. Five days after the coup Turkey invaded, and unlike 1964, there was no urging of restraint by the US State Department. There was now no need because the US-backed Junta would not go to war against Turkey without American consent. Turkish troops landed in Kyrenia in the early hours of 20 July 1974.

From 1967 until the time of the coup in 1967, there had been no further recorded incidents of inter-communal violence in Cyprus. Turkey’s alleged legal justification for her invasion in 1974 was founded under article (iv) of the Treaty of Guarantee which permits intervention, but for the sole purpose of restoring the constitutional arrangements as laid down in the London-Zurich agreements of 1959, not for the purpose of over-throwing them altogether. The article is also silent about the use of armed force in this restoration as a result of unilateral intervention. The British, who had imposed themselves as one of the three guarantor powers, and in the defence of many having caused an inter-communal problem where one had existed by abusing the status of the Turkish-Cypriot minority, now decided to avoid their obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Having insisted on the treaty in 1960, Britain’s Foreign Secretary in 1974, James Callaghan, although greatly dissapointed by Kissinger’s attitude, abdicated all responsibility to US Secretary of State.
In response to the Turkish invasion, the Greek army attempted to mobilise, but the mobilisation never really got off the ground. In addition, in Cyprus Greek troops were repeatedly withdrawn by the officers from the front-line offering an unfettered line of advance to the Turks. It was almost as if the partition of the island was pre-arranged. The corruption and incompetence of the junta over the previous six years had taken its toll. Within a few days of the invasion, the junta in Athens collapsed, followed by its puppet regime in Nicosia. Power returned to civilians under Constantine Karamalis in Greece, while the Greek Presidency went to Glafkos Clerides, Makarios’ deputy. Constitutional order, under which Turkey attempted to justify her invasion, was now restored. The cease-fire arranged by the UN now simply acted as a respite to give Turkey an opportunity to consolidate her gains and bringing in massive reinforcements to complete her strategic contingent.

It is, however, very hard to find any legal justification for Turkey’s appalling violations of human rights in Cyprus as witnessed by the findings of the Council of Europe. We know today that thousands of Cypriot civilians were murdered or tortured. Many women and children still remain missing. Over 1,000 women were raped. How can this appalling brutality be justified by an attempt to restore a constitution?
Further support for the argument that the Turkish Government’s real goal was not the restoration of constitutional order but sheer order, becomes apparent when looking at the Geneva peace conference called in the wake of the original July invasion.

On 9 August 1974, when Turkey held only the narrow Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor, the Turkish foreign minister handed an ultimatum to the Greek Cypriot negotiator Glafkos Clerides demanding the immediate cessation of 35% of Cypriot territory to the Turkish army. When Clerides requested 36 hours to discuss it with his Government, not a wholly unreasonably request given the circumstances, his request was denied.
As regards Gunes, Turkish negotiator, the demand was non-negotiable. Turkey then launched a second invasion on 14 August 1974, this time conquering 37% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. By then the Sampson regime had fallen, as had the Greek Junta. Following this second offensive begun on 14 August, Greek-Cypriot retaliatory action began against the Turks after the ethnic cleansing of Greek Cypriots from their homes had occurred, and the majority of the human rights violations were becoming known. In the village of Tokni, 69 Turkish Cypriots were killed and later found in a mass grave. In Aloa, 57 Turkish Cypriots were killed, while in Maratha a further 88 corpses were discovered in a mass grave.

Following the invasion a report was prepared by the Commission of the Council of Europe as a result of a complaint by the Cyprus Government. The report examines alleged breaches of the articles of the Convention of Human Rights of which each member of the Council of Europe (including Turkey) is a signatory. The following is the summary as printed by the "Sunday Times" on 23 January 1977:

KILLING Relevant Article of Human Rights Convention:- Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.

Charge made by Greek Cypriots: The Turkey army embarked on a systematic course of mass killings of civilians unconnected with any war activity.

Evidence given to the Commission: Witness Mrs K said that on 21 July 1974, the second day of the Turkish invasion, she and a group of villages from Elia were captured when, fleeing from bombardment, they tried to reach a range of mountains. All 12 men arrested were civilians. They were separated from the women and shot in front of the women, under orders of a Turkish officer. Some of the men were holding children, three of whom were wounded.

Written statements referred to two more group killings: at Trimithi, eye-witnesses told of the deaths of five men (two shepherds aged 60 and 70, two masons of 20 and 60, and a 19 year-old plumber). At Palekythron 30 Greek Cypriot soldiers being held prisoner were killed by their captors, according to the second statement.

Witness S gave evidence of two other mass killings at Palekythron. In each case, between 30 and 40 soldiers who had surrendered to the advancing Turks were shot. In the second case, the witness said: "the soldiers were transferred to the kilns of the village where they were shot dead and burnt in order not to leave details of what had happened".
Seventeen members of two neighbouring families, including 10 women and five children aged between two and nine were also killed in cold blood at Palekythron, reported witness H, a doctor. Further killings described in the doctor’s notes, recording evidence related to him by patients (either eye-witnesses or victims), included;

· Execution of eight civilians taken prisoner by Turkish soldiers in the area of Prastio, one day after the cease-fire on 16 August 1974.
· Killing by Turkish soldiers of five unarmed Greek Cypriot soldiers who had sought refuge in a house at Voni.
· Shooting of four women, one of whom survived by pretending she was dead.

Further evidence, taken in refugee camps and in the form of written statements, described killings of civilians in homes, streets or fields, as well as the killing of people under arrest or in detention. Eight statements described the killing of soldiers not in combat; five statements referred to a mass grave found in Dherynia.

Commission’s verdict: By 14 votes to one, the Commission considered there were "very strong indications" of violation of Article 2 and killings "committed on a substantial scale".

RAPE Relevant Article:- No one shall be subjected to torture or to in-human or degrading treatment or punishment.

Charge:- Turkish troops were responsible for wholesale and repeated rapes of women of all ages from 12 to 71. Sometimes to such an extent that the victims suffered haemorrhages or became mental wrecks. In some areas, enforced prostitution was practised, all women and girls of a village being collected and put into separate rooms in empty houses where they were raped repeatedly.
In certain cases members of the same family were repeatedly raped, some of them in front of their own children. In other cases women were brutally raped in public.

Rapes were on many occasions accompanied by brutality such as violent biting of the victims, causing severe wounding, banging their heads on the floor and wringing their throats almost to the point of suffocation. In some cases attempts to rape were followed by the stabbing or killing of the victims, including pregnant and mentally-retarded women.

Evidence given to Commission:- Testimony of doctors C and H, who examined the victims. Eye-witnesses and hearsay witnesses also gave evidence, and the Commission had before it written statements from 41 alleged victims.

Dr H said he had confirmed rape in 70 cases, including:-

· A mentally-retarded girl of 24 was raped in her house by 20 soldiers. When she started screaming they threw her from the second floor window. She fractured her spine and was paralysed.
· One day after their arrival at Voni, Turks took girls to a nearby house and raped them. ? One woman from Voni was raped on three occasions by four persons each time. She became pregnant.
· One girl, from Palekythrou, who was held with others in a house, was taken out at gun point and raped.
· At Tanvu, Turkish soldiers tried to rape a 17 year-old girl. She resisted and was shot dead.
· A woman from Gypsou told Dr H that 25 girls were kept by Turks at Marathouvouno as prostitutes.

Another witness said his wife was raped in front of their children. Witness S told of 25 girls who complained to Turkish officers about being raped and were raped again by the officers. A man (name withheld) reported that his wife was stabbed in the neck while resisting rape. His grand-daughter, aged six, had been stabbed and killed by Turkish soldiers attempting to rape her.

A Red Cross witness said that in August 1974, while the island’s telephones were still working, the Red Cross Society received calls from Palekythrou and Kaponti reporting rapes. The Red Cross also took care of 38 women released from Voni and Gypsou detention camps; all had been raped, some in front of their husbands and children. Others had been raped repeatedly, or put in houses frequented with Turkish soldiers.
These women were taken to Akrotiri hospital, in the British Sovereign Base Area, where they were treated. Three were found to be pregnant. Reference was also made to several abortions performed at the base.
Commission’s verdict:- By 12 votes to one the Commission found "that the incidents of rape described in the cases referred to and regarded as established constitute "in-human treatment" and thus violations of Article 3 for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention."

TORTURE Relevant article:- see above under Rape.

Charge: Hundreds of people, including children, women and pensioners, were victims of systematic torture and savage and humiliating treatment during their detention by the Turkish army. They were beaten, according to the allegations, sometimes to the extent of being incapacitated. Many were subjected to whipping, breaking of their teeth, knocking their heads against walls, beating with electrified clubs, stubbing of cigarettes on their skin, jumping and stepping on their chests and hands, pouring dirty liquids on them, piercing them with bayonets, etc.

Many, it was said, were ill-treated to such an extent that they became mental and physical wrecks. The brutalities complained of reached their climax after the cease-fire agreements; in fact, most of the acts described were committed at a time when Turkish armed forces were not engaged in any war activities.

Evidence to Commission: Main witness was a school teacher, one of 2,000 Greek Cypriot men deported to Turkey. He stated that he and his fellow detainees were repeatedly beaten after their arrest, on their way to Adana (in Turkey), in jail at Adana and in prison camp at Amasya.
On ship to Turkey:- "That was another moment of terrible beating again. We were tied all the time. I lost the sense of touch. I could not feel anything for about two or three months. Every time we asked for water or spoke we were beaten."

Arriving at Adana:- "... then, one by one, they led us to prisons, through a long corridor .. Going through that corridor was another terrible experience. There were about 100 soldiers from both sides with sticks, clubs and with their fists beating every one of us while going to the other end of the corridor. I was beaten at least 50 times until I reached the other end.

"In Adana anyone who said he wanted to see a doctor was beaten.

"Beating was on the agenda every day. There were one or two very good, very nice people, but they were afraid to show their kindness, as they told us."

Witness P spoke of:-

· A fellow prisoner who was kicked in the mouth. He lost several teeth "and his lower jaw came off in pieces".
· A Turkish officer, a karate student, who exercised every day by hitting prisoners.
· Fellow prisoners who were hung by the feet over the hole of a lavatory for hours.
· A Turkish second lieutenant who used to prick all prisoners with a pin when they were taken into a yard.

Evidence from Dr H said that prisoners were in an emaciated condition on their return to Cyprus. On nine occasions he had found signs of wounds.
The doctor gave a general description of conditions in Adana and in detention camps in Cyprus (at Pavlides Garage and the Saray Prison in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia) as reported to him by former detainees. Food, he said, consisted of one-eight of a loaf of bread a day, with occasional olives; there were about two buckets of water and two mugs which were never cleaned, from which about 1,000 people had to drink; toilets were filthy, with faeces rising over the basins; floors were covered with faeces and urine; in jail in Adana prisoners were kept 76 to a cell with three towels between them and one block of soap per eight persons per month to wash themselves and their clothes.

One man, it was alleged, had to amputate his own toes with a razor blade as a consequence of ill-treatment. Caught in Achna with another man, they had been beaten up with hard objects. When he asked for a glass of water he was given a glass full of urine. His toes were then stepped on until they became blue, swollen and eventually gangrenous (the other man was said to have been taken to hospital in Nicosia, where he agreed to have his legs amputated. He did not survive the operation).
According to witness S:- "hundreds of Greek Cypriots were beaten and dozens were executed. They have cut off their ears in some cases, like the case of Palekythron and Trahoni ..." (verbatim record).
Verdict by Commission: By 12 votes to one, the Commission concluded that prisoners were in a number of cases physically ill-treated by Turkish soldiers.

"These acts of ill-treatment caused considerable injuries and in at least one case, death of a victim. By their severity they constitute "in-human treatment" in the sense of Article 3, for which Turkey is responsible under the Convention."

LOOTING Relevant article:- Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

Charge: In all Turkish-occupied areas the Turkish army systematically looted houses and businesses of Greek Cypriots.
Evidence to Commission: Looting in Kyrenia was described by witness C:- "... The first days of looting of the shops was done by the army of heavy things like refrigerators, laundry machines, television sets" (verbatim record).
For weeks after the invasion, he said, he had watched Turkish naval ships taking on board the looted goods.
Witness K, a barrister, described the pillage of Famagusta:- "At two o’clock an organised, systematic, terrifying, shocking, unbelievable looting started ... We heard the breaking of doors, some of them iron doors, smashing of glass, and we were waiting for them any minute to enter the house. This lasted for about four hours."
Written statements by eye-witnesses of looting were corroborated by several reports by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Verdict of Commission: The Commission accepted that looting and robbery on an extensive scale, by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots, had taken place. By 12 votes to one, it established that there had been deprivation of possessions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale.

OTHER CHARGES

On four counts:- the Commission concluded that Turkey had also violated an Article of the Convention asserting the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. The Commission also decided that Turkey was continuing to violate the Article by refusing to allow the return of more than 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the north.
On three counts:- the Commission said Turkey had breached an Article laying down the right to liberty and security of persons by confining more than 2,000 Greek Cypriots in schools and churches.
Finally, the Commission said Turkey had violated two more articles that specify that the rights and freedoms in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any grounds, and that anyone whose rights are violated "shall have an effective remedy before a national authority."

The European Commission on Human Rights has outlined in great detail the actions of the Turkish armed forces and the treatment that it handed out to those Greek Cypriot civilians with whom it came into contact. 5,000 Greek Cypriot civilians were murdered, over 1,000 women were raped. Over 1,619 Greek Cypriots were abducted and remain missing, their whereabouts never disclosed by the Turkish authorities. The brutality the Turkish army brought with it was specifically designed to terrify the local Greek Cypriot creating 200,000 refugees.

By 18 August the Turkish army had drawn a line (aptly called the Attila line) across the island, which remains to this day and follows the proposed line suggested in 1957 very closely. The long cherished aims of Kibris Turktur were partly fulfilled and there have been numerous calls since 1974 from Turkish nationalist groups to go on and "finish the job".
An ethnic group, which in 1964 owned about 12% of the land of Cyprus, had managed, by means of violence and manipulation, in gaining control of over 37%.